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Abstract 
 
This paper examines international trade in tainted food and other low-quality products. We 
first find that for a large class of environments, free trade is the trading system that conveys 
the highest incentives to produce non-tainted high-quality goods by foreign exporters. 
However, free trade cannot prevent the export of tainted products, and the condition for 
tainting to arise becomes more easily satisfied, if the marginal cost of high-quality production 
increases or if errors of testing product quality matter. We also examine cases of image-
building investments and sabotage of rivals, and find that a tariff in either case reduces the 
foreign firm’s incentives to produce high quality, which in turn tends to increase import 
tainting. 
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1. Introduction 
Media around the world abound with examples of malpractices in the daily running of 
international trade. In particular, headlines have alarmed consumers on the safety issues of 
imported products. Recently, it was revealed that some unscrupulous companies in China had 
routinely added melamine to milk to artificially boost protein readings in quality tests. 
Though imports from China have drawn the most criticism,1 producers in other developing 
nations violate basic food safety standards as well (Mexican cantaloupe, Indian relishes, etc.). 
Furthermore, firms of developed countries have also been known for committing the alleged 
crime of using dangerous ingredients. For example, Morinaga Milk Industry of Japan added 
industrial arsenic to improve the solubility of dairy products around 1953; aniline was added 
to rapeseed oil in Spain in 1981; and most recently, it was found that Peanut Corp. America 
continued to sell their tainted peanuts and pastes for more than a year, even after the 
company knew the products tested positive for salmonella. As more goods from distant 
locations are increasingly traded internationally, the question of what determines the deviant 
behavior of enterprises assumes considerable importance. 
An important factor affecting firms’ behavior is consumers’ preference for 
domestically made products over imported goods, especially when it comes to buying food. 
Consumers in richer countries discount goods made abroad, more so those coming from 
developing countries such as China and India. Thus, goods with the same attributes become 
differentiated by their countries of origin, and are priced differently. Given this, various 
governments and consumer organizations of nations relying on food imports have repeatedly 
put forward the view that the process of further globalization should be halted. Central to the 
                                                 
1 Other cases include unapproved toothpaste, seafood containing antibiotics, deadly pet food, etc. 
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issue, is the popular conjecture that the global food crisis calls for more restrictions on 
international trade in order to increase consumption of local products.2  
This paper examines the theoretical premises of such conjecture in a model of quality 
choice, with international trade involving tainted food and other low-quality products. We are 
especially interested in the conditions where foreign firms have incentives to produce tainted 
goods. In addition, we ask questions such as: (i) Does globalization via freer trade lower 
product safety? (ii) How does a firm’s strategic behavior such as image building and 
sabotage affect rivals’ export quality? (iii) And ultimately how is consumer welfare affected? 
Consider two firms Home (H) and Foreign (F) competing in the home market. The 
foreign firm has access to two technologies, one producing a low-quality variant (e.g., tainted 
food in the present model) and the other producing high quality. A domestic health authority 
that controls quality of imports is only able to inspect a small fraction of total shipments. 
This inspection ratio is determined by the home government and known to consumers before 
they make consumption decisions and to firms before they make their choices of output and 
investment in quality.3 Given this, our setup is a sequence of market structures that span over 
two periods. The foreign firm chooses the optimal quality strategy by maximizing the 
expected net present value of profits across qualities. Of these two technologies, which one is 
selected is private information of the foreign firm only. 
The foreign producer has thus more information regarding the quality it sells and is 
fully aware that low-quality exports are tainted. In contrast home consumers are unable to  
                                                 
2 In Japan, a government survey conducted in September 2008 found that 89 percent of respondents said they would choose 
domestically produced products over imports; 93.2 percent said that Japan should be more self-reliant in procuring 
foodstuffs (The Daily Yomiuri, November 16, 2008). 
3 For example, it is known that the US Food and Drug Administration checks only 1% of all shipments bound to the US 
market. In Japan, about 11% of imported goods are inspected (The Japan Times Online, Nov. 26, 2008). 
 3
recognize tainting before they actually purchase and use imported goods. This creates a 
problem of asymmetric information. Given this, we adopt the experience goods approach that 
allows consumers to learn about the product. The foreign firm’s quality becomes observable 
to consumers only through experience with the product, or by obtaining a certificate of 
quality issued by inspection authorities in the domestic country. Some consumers (usually 
with a lower income) are still willing to consume positive amounts of uninspected low-
quality goods. Tainting takes them by surprise because the poisoning of goods is outside any 
prior regarding possible states of the world.4 Problems of asymmetric information in an 
international context have also been solved using quality-signaling games or signaling games 
of incomplete information.5  We believe that signaling is more appropriate when higher 
quality is involved. In the present paper, since we focus on lower quality and tainted goods, it 
is natural that sellers do not want to signal or be signaled as “tainted”. Sellers could signal 
quality in various ways, however, there is no guarantee that they do not over-report or even 
lie about quality. In addition, consumers from richer countries have usually a bias against 
foreign made goods, and thus experience seems more trustable than foreign promises or 
signaling. In fact, most cases of tainting and poisoning that are reported in the media were 
only discovered after incidents occurred, which supports the argument that consumption 
experience mattered more than other mechanisms.6 
                                                 
4 In the literature, Nelson (1970) is the first to systematically analyze the differences between experience goods and search 
goods, and makes some predictions about consumer behavior and market structure with the two types of goods. Under 
experience goods, Chen (1991) shows that an R&D subsidy characterizes optimal infant industry intervention, and it can 
also help individual firms to appropriate the benefits of quality-enhancing investments. Bergès-Sennou and Watson (2005) 
focus on product labeling issues and show that for products purchased infrequently, introducing a reputable private label is 
unsustainable. However, more retailer bargaining power increases the likelihood of a private label good being marketed.  
5 For papers on signaling quality of imports, see Bagwelland Staiger(1989), Qiu (1994), Shy (2000), and Daughety and 
Reinganum (2008) among others.  
6 Numerous casualties were reported in a series of food incidents that occurred in the past several years. For example, six 
infants died and more than 300,000 became sick after consuming milk contaminated with melamine (International Herald 
Tribune, November 29, 2009). 
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We first find that for a large class of environments, free trade is the trading system 
that provides the highest incentives to produce non-tainted high-quality abroad. In the present 
model of experience goods, under an import tariff, the foreign firm’s profits are reduced for 
one period if it exports tainted goods (which cannot be sold in the second period), but for two 
periods if it produces high-quality goods. Under normal conditions profits are lowered more 
by the tariff with high-quality production than with tainted goods, which in turn reduces the 
foreign firm’s incentives to produce high-quality goods. However, free trade is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition to exclude trade in tainted products.  
The condition for tainting to arise is more easily satisfied if the marginal cost of high-
quality production increases, and low quality is always produced if this marginal cost is 
sufficiently high. Likewise this condition is also more easily satisfied if errors of testing 
matter. The intuition can be roughly understood as follows. Some testing errors (the so-called 
Type I) harm the foreign exporter because its high-quality exports are prohibited after 
inspection. Other errors (the so-called Type II) are a tragedy from the domestic society’s 
standpoint, since inspectors mistake tainted goods for high-quality ones. Obviously the latter 
errors benefit the foreign exporter when he produces low-cost tainted goods. 
The basic setup is then enlarged to cover cases where the foreign firm invests to 
enhance consumers’ perception of its products (i.e., image building). Then the result that free 
trade provides the highest incentives for high quality production is reinforced, the reasoning 
being that freer trade allows the foreign exporter to capture more rents from image building. 
Another interesting case is sabotage by domestic competitors, which arises more often when 
foreign imports are of high quality (low-quality imports will die in the second period and 
thus need not be sabotaged). We find that more tainting arises if an import tariff is imposed 
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which would lower the domestic rival’s cost of sabotage and increase its sabotage activities. 
This in turn allows the domestic firm to strengthen its leadership in high-quality production 
and gain market power. Consumers on the other hand have the most to lose. 
Our results are closely related to the observation that industrialized countries 
generally maintain relatively high tariff and nontariff barriers in agriculture and in processed 
food sectors. World Bank (2001) reports that average protection in those countries was about 
nine times higher for agriculture than for manufacturing imports. Though tariffs have 
decreased in recent years, nontraditional impediments such as health, technical and sanitary 
standards have replaced them, and compliance to these standards imposes additional costs on 
exporters from developing countries. Moreover, agricultural subsidies to member countries 
such as those in the EU and NAFTA countries worsen the situation. The present model 
implies that tainting is more severe in agriculture than in manufacturing imports; and an 
effective way of reducing tainting is to lower tariff and non-tariff barriers, contrary to the 
conventional wisdom that more import restrictions should be imposed. Obviously 
governments could try to increase inspection. However, due to type I and type II errors and 
especially the high cost of inspection (such as canned food or fresh produce), it often may not 
be feasible. Lowering trade barriers is perhaps necessary when in practice it is difficult to 
increase inspection due to various constraints related to budget, personnel, or technology.  
Welfare analysis is complicated in this model because in the presence of tainting 
there is a difference between ex ante and ex post welfare, and how much welfare suffers ex 
post depends on how poisonous the tainted product is. However, the following point is clear: 
if tainting is not too poisonous, then importing some low-quality goods may yield higher 
welfare than importing only high-quality goods when the latter are too costly to produce. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 lay out the setup of the model. 
Section 4 calculates expected profits across qualities and examines the conditions under 
which tainted food is imported. Sections 5 to 7 extend the model to include errors of testing, 
image-building investments and sabotage. Section 8 looks into domestic welfare and how it 
relates to model parameters. We conclude in Section 9. 
2. The Basic Setup 
Our framework consists of a domestic (H) and a foreign (F) producing firm that serve 
the domestic market only. Goods made in H have the highest recognition in both brand name 
and quality while those made in F have low acceptance by home consumers. There are two 
periods, 1 and 2. At the outset of period 1 firm F decides whether to produce and export low-
quality or high-quality goods. In choosing quality, firm F anticipates the sequence of market 
structures of Table 1 and selects its quality based on the comparison of expected net present 
value of profits. Local health authorities inspect imports with exogenous probability  . 
Initially we assume that authorities can always tell if a good is non-tainted after inspection. 
Later in Section 5 we examine errors of testing, when inspection fails to uncover tainting.  
Panel (a) of Table 1 describes the case when firm F decides to produce low quality. In 
the basic model we consider low quality to be synonymous with being tainted and poisonous, 
and relaxations will be discussed in detail in the conclusions. Given that firm F produces 
low-quality goods, if its exports are inspected, then the shipment is not allowed to enter; if 
not inspected then firm F’s exports are sold into the domestic market. As consumers cannot 
observe the quality of the imported good, they experience its quality instead by consuming 
the good in period 1 and then learn that it is of the low-quality type. With this experience 
they decide not to consume the low-quality good in period 2. 
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Table 1  Firm F’s Strategies and Market Structures 
(a) Firm F Producing Low Quality 
Inspection Probabilities Period 1 Period 2 
Inspection ( ) No imports; domestic 
monopoly 
No imports; domestic 
monopoly 
No inspection (1 )  Duopoly with differentiated 
products 
No imports; domestic 
monopoly 
(b) Firm F Producing High Quality 
Inspection Probabilities Period 1 Period 2 
Inspection ( ) Certification: duopoly with 
homogeneous products 
Duopoly with 
homogeneous products 
No inspection (1 )  Duopoly with differentiated 
products 
Duopoly with 
homogeneous products 
Panel (b) of Table 1 describes the case of firm F producing high quality. If the 
product is inspected, it receives a certificate stating it is of the highest quality identical to 
homemade goods. Consumers do not need to experience the product to learn of its quality as 
the certificate is identifiable. For products that are not inspected, consumers learn of the 
quality through consumption and, in period 2 the qualities of all goods become known.7  
Normally, higher quality goods require higher costs to produce. This, along with the 
market structure, will affect firm F’s profits. In panel (a) firm H is a monopolist in all cells 
except when goods are not inspected in period 1, when the market structure is a duopoly with 
differentiated goods since consumers differentiate goods by country of origin. In panel (b), 
the market structure is a duopoly with homogeneous goods in all cells except when goods are 
not inspected in period 1, in which case we have a duopoly with differentiated goods.  
                                                 
7 We abstract thus from cases where firm F may produce a mixture of low and high qualities to decrease the odds of 
detection. Also, with two qualities firm F may choose to produce high quality in period 1 and low quality in period 2. 
Experience leads then to misleading results in a finite time horizon, but not in an infinite horizon. 
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3. Consumer Demand 
A typical Home consumer consumes a numeraire good m, and two differentiated 
goods x and x*, respectively produced by firm H and firm F. Goods made at Home have the  
highest quality while those made in F have low acceptance by home consumers, due to 
problems of reputation, asymmetric information, etc. Given the above, the typical Home 
consumer can be assumed to maximize the following utility function: 
   * *( , , ) ( , )V m x x m U x x        (1) 
where 
   * * 2 *2 *( , ) ( ) / 2U x x x x x x xx          (2) 
 
where (0,1]   indicates the degree of substitutability between goods x and x* : the two 
goods become more substitutable as   increases.8 Similar demand specifications are used in 
the literature, see e.g. Dixit (1988) and Bester and Petrakis (1993).  
Parameter [0,1]   represents home consumers’ valuation of imports and bias 
against foreign production. With 1   the marginal utility that a home consumer derives 
from consuming the foreign good is lower than from home goods, reflecting the argument 
that consumers in rich countries discount imported goods from poor countries.9 In practice it 
can represent product quality, food safety or brand recognition, etc. As for the relationship 
between   and  , we can think of the former as coming from the manufacturing process, 
which causes the two products to be different possibly in appearance, quality, taste, etc. but 
the latter as coming from consumers’ perception of the products. 
                                                 
8 We do not consider the case where goods are complements, i.e., when 0  . 
9 The marginal rate of substitution between units of the same commodity, produced in different countries, is different from 
unity when 1  : ** *(1 )/ ) / (x x x xdx dx         . 
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Denote by p  and *p  the price for each firm’s product. Maximization of consumers’ 
problem in (1) subject to the standard budget constraint yields the inverse demand functions 
for goods x  and *x  in units of good m: 
 * *( , ) 1p x x x x   ,   * * *( , )p x x x x       (3) 
The corresponding direct demand functions are: 
 
*
*
2 2 2
1( , )
1 1 1
p px p p    
     , 
*
* *
2 2 2( , ) 1 1 1
p px p p     
      (3’) 
Equations in (3’) reproduce the properties known in the literature. For example, own-price 
effects are larger than cross-price effects. Also the market scale is higher for home goods 
than for foreign goods as long as 1  . 
4. Tainted Food 
Since we focus on firm F’s choices and on home government’s design of incentives to 
improve import quality, let us assume that firm H always produces high quality using a 
production technology represented by the cost function C(x)=cx, with 1c   to ensure positive 
demands. Home government levies a specific tariff t on imports from F. Home health 
authorities charge a fixed fee *K to cover costs of inspection. The foreign firm has access to 
two technologies (indexed by i), one producing a low-quality variant l and the other 
producing high quality h. Marginal costs are given by *lc  and *hc , and we require: 
Assumption 1:  * *l hc c  and * 1hc t c   . 
This assumption reflects technical requirements on quality control that drive up the cost of 
high quality relative to low-quality production. The marginal cost of tainted food production 
is assumed sufficiently low. 
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4.1 Market Structures 
In equilibrium, different sets of prices will be charged depending on the quality 
choice made by firm F (i=l,h). As most goods we are considering are processed goods for 
which capacity constraints play a lesser role, we assume firms in the product market compete 
in price 10 . Then, we can straightforwardly derive the equilibrium of the three market 
structures described in Table 1. 
Domestic Monopoly 
The domestic monopoly arises when local health authorities uncover tainted food. 
The situation arises also when consumers experience the imported commodity as tainted. 
Imports are then prohibited ( * 0lx  ) and firm H becomes the sole supplier, as under autarky. 
Given this information, domestic profits are 2(1 ) / 4l c    in all relevant periods and, the 
time profile of foreign profits becomes * *l K   in the first period and zero otherwise. 
Duopoly with Homogenous Goods 
This is the case of three cells in Table 1 (b). When average costs are constant but not 
equal across firms, Bertrand competition yields an equilibrium in which the firm with the 
lowest marginal cost is the only one to produce positive output. The equilibrium price is then 
the limit price equal to (or slightly below) the marginal cost of the second most efficient firm: 
   *max ,h hp c c t c        (4) 
It follows that domestic profits are driven down to zero and, foreign profits become: 
   * * *(1 )( )h hc c c t K           (5) 
                                                 
10 Results would not change qualitatively if Cournot competition is assumed instead but derivations would become more 
involving. 
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in period 1 and * *(1 )( )h hc c c t      in other cells. 
Duopoly with Differentiated Goods 
A duopoly with differentiated goods arises in one cell of Table 1(a) and of Table 1(b), 
in period 1 and when imports are not inspected. Both firms make their supply decisions 
rationally. Each of them holds Bertrand conjecture about the decisions of the other producer. 
Profits of the two firms are respectively: 
* *( , ) ( ) ( , )i i i i ip p p c x p p   , * * * * *( , ) ( ) ( , )i i i i ip p p c t x p p       , i = l,h (6) 
The Nash-Bertrand equilibrium can be obtained as: 
 2 * 2{(2 ) 2 ( )}/(4 )i ip c c t          ,     (7a)
 * 2 * 2{ (2 ) 2( )}/(4 )i ip c c t           ,      (7b)
 2 * 2 2{(2 )(1 ) ( )}/(4 )(1 )i ix c c t            ,      (7c)
 * 2 * 2 2{(2 )( ) (1 )}/(4 )(1 )i ix c t c            .    (7d) 
Using (7a) and (7c), the equilibrium profits of firm H are obtained as: 2 21 (1 )i ix    for i = 
l,h. Firm F’s equilibrium profits are obtained from (7b) and (7d): 
  * 2 *2(1 )i ix  , i = l,h.      (8) 
The market equilibrium obtained in (7c) and (7d) has a number of properties. For example, 
there exists a prohibitive tariff * 2(1 ) / (2 )i it c c          that shuts down imports. Also 
*
i ix x  when * 1ic c t     , i.e., when the difference in marginal costs is less than offset 
by the difference in market scales. In addition, Assumption 1 implies * *l hx x  and from (8) it 
follows that * *l h  , which makes this market equilibrium particularly interesting. 
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 The above discussion is summarized in Table 2 in terms of foreign production and 
foreign profits. For the sake of clarity we introduce a first subscript to denote time, a second 
to represent quality as before, and superscript ‘I’ to indicate when imports are inspected. 
4.2 Firm F’s Quality Choice 
Firm F’s decisions are made at the outset of period 1, but affect the profits of two periods. 
Then the expected profits of low-quality production over two periods are given by: 
* * * * *
1 2 1 2( ) ( ) (1 ) (1 )
I I
l l l l l               
where   denotes the private discount factor across periods. Making use of Table 2(a): 
* * 2 *2
1(1 )(1 )l lK x             (9) 
Parameter   plays no role in (9) as firm F is not active in the second period. On the other 
hand, expected profits of high-quality production over two periods: 
* * * * *
1 2 1 2( ) ( ) (1 ) (1 )
I I
h h h h h               
Making use of Table 2(b) gives: 
  * * * 2 *21( ) (1 )( ) (1 )(1 )h h hc c c t K x                  (10) 
Table 2  Foreign Firm’s Profits 
(a) Low-quality  
Inspection Probabilities  Period 1 Period 2 
Inspection   *
1( ) 0
I
lx   
* *
1( )
I
l K    
*
2( ) 0
I
lx   
*
2( ) 0
I
l 
No inspection (1 )  * 2 *
1 2 2
1 1( )( ){(2 )( ) (1 )}
4 1l l
x c t c           
* 2 *2
1 1(1 )l lx   
*
2 0lx   
*
2 0l   
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(b) High-quality 
Therefore at the outset of period 1 firm F faces the following binary decision problem: 
* * ( , )l hMax   ; that is, choosing the optimal quality strategy by maximizing the expected net 
present value of profits. Using (9) and (10) we can establish the following proposition: 
Proposition 1 (Tainted food): Tainted food is produced and exported by the foreign firm 
when the following condition is fulfilled:   
2 2
*
* *
* *
2 2 2
(1 )(2 ) 2 (1 )
2 ( )(1 )( )
4 (2 )
( ) ( 2 )   
( ) (1 ) h
h l
h l
c
c c c t
c c c c t     
      
           (11) 
Proof: The difference in expected profits between low- and high-quality productions is 
obtained by taking the difference between (9) and (10): 
 * * * 2 *2 *21 1( )[(1 )( )] (1 )(1 )( )l h h l hc c c t x x                 (12) 
Making use of (7d) to substitute for *1lx  and
*
1hx : 
 
* * *
2 2
* * * *
2 2 2
( )[(1 )( )]
(1 ) (2 ) 2( ) (2 2 ) (1 )
(1 ) (4 ) (2 )
l h h
h l h l
c c c t
c c c c t c
 
    
       
            
  (12’) 
which is positive when condition (11) is met. ■ 
Inspection 
Probabilities  
Period 1 Period 2 
Inspection 
  
*
1( ) 1
I
hx c   
* * *
1( ) (1 )( )
I
h hc c c t K       
*
2( ) 1
I
hx c   
* *
2( ) (1 )( )
I
h hc c c t    
No 
inspection 
(1 )  
* 2 *
1 2 2
1 1( )( ){(2 )( ) (1 )}
4 1h h
x c t c         
* 2 *2
1 1(1 )h hx   
*
2 1hx c   
* *
2 (1 )( )h hc c c t      
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Firm F chooses to export tainted products when condition (11) is met, that is when 
single-period profits of low-quality production are higher than multi-period profits of high-
quality production. As formulated in (11), the first term represents the positive difference 
between profits of low- and high-quality production when home and foreign products are 
differentiated. The second term represents profits from high-quality production under limit 
pricing. As condition (11) depends on all primitive parameters of the model, namely the 
marginal costs, parameters , , ,    , and the import tariff t, Table 3 reproduces its 
monotonicity results, from which we obtain: 
Proposition 2: The incentives to produce tainted products are decreased if the inspection 
rate  , the discount factor   or the cost of producing low-quality *lc  rises. On the other 
hand, an increase in the foreign firm’s scale parameter   or the marginal cost of home 
production c raises the foreign firm’s incentives to produce tainted products. 
Proof: see Table 3. 
Table 3  Monotonicity Results of Equation (11) 
   *
hc
*
lc c  t 
* *
l h  - - ? - + + ?
Note that expression (11) is never met and tainted products are never produced when 
* *
h lc c . The intuition is that high-quality production is never out of reach for firms in the 
foreign country, simply because compliance costs that must be incurred to meet the sanitary 
standards imposed by the H government are low. These producers prefer then to make and 
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export high-quality products. However, increasing *hc  has a non-linear effect on the profit 
differential but the sign cannot be determined a priori (though expected to be positive). 
In Table 3, free trade is represented by setting 0t  . From (11) the inequality sign 
does not necessarily reverse with 0t  , that is, free trade alone cannot exclude trade in 
tainted products. However, firm F’s incentives can be compared under free trade and under a 
positive tariff. To that end we focus on * *( )h l   instead, and making use of (12’) gives: 
* * * * 2 2
* *
2 2 2
( ) ( ) 2(1 )(2 )( )(1 ) ( )
(1 )(4 )
h l l h
h lc c ct t
    
                   (13) 
Expression (13) can be either positive or negative. The first term represents the loss in profits 
from high quality when limit pricing is applied whereas the second term measures the net 
gain in profits under product differentiation. We thus have the following result, noting that 
freer trade in our framework means a decrease in t: 
Proposition 3 (Free trade): Free trade is the trading system that gives the highest incentives 
to foreign exporters to produce non-tainted high-quality goods when:  
  
2 2
* *
2 2 2
2(1 )(2 )( )(1 ) ( )
(1 )(4 ) h l
c c c    
      .    (14) 
However, free trade is neither necessary nor sufficient to exclude trade in tainted products. 
Condition (14) describes the parameter space under which free trade is the optimal 
trading system. It is fulfilled when * *h lc c  but may fail to hold with * *h lc c . This shows that 
the free trading system can been undermined by national governments which in practice 
introduce nontraditional impediments such as health, technical and sanitary standards whose 
compliance imposes additional costs on exporters from developing countries. 
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Figure 1 gives a graphical representation of (14) for *lc  given. Values for c and 
*
hc are 
allowed to vary between 0 and 1 but are constrained by the two inequalities of Assumption 1, 
depicted here by lines * ( )hc c t   and 1c  . The downward sloping line is the solution of *hc  
in terms of c such that condition (14) is satisfied. Every combination below this line indicates 
when the inequality sign holds strictly. The shaded area gives all combinations of *hc  and c 
where free trade is the policy of choice that excludes tainting. That free trade can be optimal 
runs counter to the popular claim put forward by some government officials and consumer 
organizations that favor increased protectionism as a means to prevent tainted imports.  
   Figure 1  Tainting and Free Trade 
 
       Notes: (a) The shaded area gives all pairs *( , )hc c  such that free trade is  
           optimal; (b) 2 2 2 21 ( )(1 )(4 ) / 2(1 )(2 ) 0             . 
5.  Type I and Type II Errors of Testing 
So far we have assumed that inspection is perfect so that all low-quality, tainted 
goods are found and banned from entering country H. However, as plenty of evidence 
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shows,11 errors of testing arise frequently when inspectors fail to find fault with tainted goods, 
and by mistake, label them as high-quality goods. We investigate this situation here. 
 Let us assume that the null hypothesis (H0) is the presumption of innocence, meaning 
the absence of tainting in foreign exports. Given this, Table 4 describes the two possible 
errors that are made in testing procedures. A Type I error ( ) is highly undesirable from the 
foreign exporter’s standpoint: with probability , its high-quality good is by mistake found 
of being tainted. Then his exports are denied entry into the domestic market and his 
reputation is tarnished. A Type II error (  ) is a tragedy from the domestic society’s 
standpoint: with probability  , foreign tainted goods are by mistake not detected. As a 
consequence, a certificate of high quality is issued and consumers’ health is in jeopardy. 
Table 4  Errors of Testing 
 High-quality production Low-quality production 
Reject H0 Type I error ( ): 
false positive 
Correct 
Fail to reject H0 Correct Type II error ( ): 
false negative 
Errors of testing affect the likelihood of different market outcomes but only occur 
when inspection is first performed. Table 5 reproduces part of Table 2 but corrects inspection 
probabilities for testing errors. Under Type I error  , high-quality products are considered as 
tainted and excluded from the market, leading to new entries in panel (b) of Table 5: 
                                                 
11 The New York Times (March 6, 2009) cites many examples in "Food Safety Problems Elude Private Inspectors". For 
instance, the American Institute of Baking which after performing audits at Peanut Corp. America, reported that "the overall 
food safety level of this facility was considered to be superior." Federal investigators later discovered salmonella. 
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*
1( ) 0
I
hx  , * *1( )Ih K   , *2( ) 0Ihx  , *2( ) 0Ih  . 
Expected profits of high-quality production can be computed as: 
 * * * 2 *21( (1 )) (1 )( ) (1 )(1 )h h hc c c t K x                    . (15) 
Compared to (10) a new negative term linked to Type I error   enters (15). A Type I error 
harms the foreign exporter because its exports that were previously sold at the high -quality 
price are now prohibited after inspection. The beneficiary of the Type I error is the domestic 
firm since with probability   it becomes a monopolist in all periods. 
Table 5  Testing Errors and Foreign Firm’s Profits 
(a) Low-quality  
Inspection Probabilities Period 1 Period 2 
Inspection (1 )   *
1( ) 0
I
lx   
* *
1( )
I
l K    
*
2( ) 0
I
lx   
*
2( ) 0
I
l   
Inspection  *
1( ) 1
I
lx c   
* * *
1( ) (1 )( )
I
l lc c c t K     
*
2( ) 0
I
lx   
*
2( ) 0
I
l   
(b) High-quality 
The effect of a Type II error is more consequential. It follows that in period 1 low-
quality foreign imports are labeled as high-quality and compete with homemade goods so we 
have a homogenous duopoly where the limit pricing rule applies. However, in period 2, 
Inspection Probabilities  Period 1 Period 2 
Inspection (1 )   *
1( ) 1
I
hx c   
* * *
1( ) (1 )( )
I
h hc c c t K     
*
2( ) 1
I
hx c   
* *
2( ) (1 )( )
I
h hc c c t    
Inspection   *
1( ) 0
I
hx   
* *
1( )
I
h K    
*
2( ) 0
I
hx   
*
2( ) 0
I
h   
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consumers having experienced tainted imports refuse to buy them anymore, and the domestic 
firm becomes a monopolist. We thus have the following entries in panel (a) of Table 5: 
 *1( ) 1
I
lx c  ,  * * *1( ) 1 )( )(Il l tc c c K     ,  *2( ) 0Ilx  ,  *2( ) 0Il  . 
As indicated earlier, firm F’s decisions are made at the outset of period 1, but affect 
the profits of two periods. Repeating the steps of the preceding section, expected profits 
under low-quality production can be computed on the basis of Tables 2 and 5: 
* * * 2 *2
1(1 )( ) (1 )(1 )l l lK c c c t x             .  (16) 
Compared to (9), a new term that reflects Type II error enters positively in (16): a Type II 
error benefits the foreign exporter when he produces low-cost tainted food because with 
probability   its tainted goods are now allowed to sell at the high-quality price. With 
0   , (15) and (16) reduce to (10) and (9) respectively, and using them, the difference 
in expected profits between low- and high-quality productions becomes: 
 
* * * *
2 2
* * * *
2 2 2
( (1 ))[(1 )( )] (1 )( )
(1 ) (2 ) 2( ) (2 2 ) (1 )
(1 ) (4 ) (2 )
l h h l
h l h l
c c c t c c c t
c c c c t c
    
    
               
            
 (17) 
From (17) and the above discussion we can establish the following proposition: 
Proposition 4 (Type I & Type II errors): Type I errors ( ) and Type II errors ( ) of 
testing increase profits and incentives to produce and export tainted products. 
From (17), testing errors also change how the tariff affects the profit differential: 
 * * 2 2 * *2 2 2( ) 2(1 )(2 )(1 ) (1 ) ( )(1 )(4 )h l h lc c ct
       
                (18) 
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which reduces to (13) when 0    but is larger otherwise. Depending on the values of 
 and , (18) can turn negative. As a result the shaded area that gives all combinations of 
*
hc and c such that free trade is the prevailing policy is smaller in Figure 2 than in Figure 1. 
Thus, testing errors undermine the free trading system as a devise to provide incentives to 
produce and trade high-quality products. 
Figure 2  Testing Errors and Free Trade 
 
 Notes: (a) The shaded area gives all pairs *( , )hc c  such that free trade is optimal; 
              (b) 2 2 2 22 ( (1 )(4 ) / 2(1 )(2 ) 0(1 (1 ) ) )                   with 2 1   . 
6. The Role of Investments 
So far    ( 1 ) has been assumed exogenous. However, foreign firms can undertake 
investments to enhance consumers’ perception of their products. The objective is to affect 
consumers’ preference which usually favors homemade goods over imports, especially when 
they come from developing countries or when it concerns food products. Investments could 
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be done via advertising campaigns and trade fairs. Hence,   becomes endogenous and an 
‘optimal’  can be obtained in our model by introducing profit-maximizing investments.12  
Firm H that enjoys the reputation of a high-quality producer may counteract firm F’s 
attempt by damaging the latter’s product image. The market would evolve then in two stages, 
with both firms deciding simultaneously on how much to invest. However if * 1ic c t     , 
foreign imports are higher than home production ( *i ix x ) since the marginal-cost difference 
is less than the market-scale difference. Also 2 *2 2 2(1 ) (1 )i ix x    ; that is, the operational 
profits are higher for F than for H, enabling F to outcompete H in an investment game if the 
latter decides to lower F’s product image. Hence, H which has other more rewarding 
disrupting activities (see next section) does not participate, and F becomes the sole investor.  
A duopoly with differentiated goods arises in one cell of Table 1(a) and 1(b), in 
period 1 and when imports are not inspected. With investment the market is assumed to 
evolve in two stages, decisions made in stage 1 being fully observable in stage 2. First, firm F 
decides unilaterally on how much to invest in perception enhancement. Second, both firms 
make their supply decisions rationally. We assume Bertrand conjecture and solve the model 
by backward induction as before.  
As the solution obtained in (7a)-(7b) and (8) describes the market equilibrium of the 
second stage it suffices to focus on the investment decision in the first stage. Profits of the 
two firms in the second stage of the game are respectively: 
 2 2(1 )i ix  ,    * 2 *2 *(1 )i i fx   ,    i = l,h   (19) 
                                                 
12 There are however some constraints. For example, investments are only optimal under differentiated products since in 
other market structures, imports are either prohibited or experienced and certified, which make investments redundant. 
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where *f  denotes first-stage investment which is common to both qualities and where 
outputs ix  and 
*
ix  are given by (7c) and (7d). In the first stage, firm F tries to improve home 
consumers’ perception of its product. In particular, it invests in order to increase its market 
scale variable   by using the following linear technology: 
  *f            (20)  
As firm F does not want to reveal its product quality, it chooses a single level of investment 
across product qualities. We assume it does so by maximizing the sum of first-period profits 
( * *l h  ). Using (20) in *ix , profit maximization with respect to *f  gives: 
2
* *
2
(2 ) ( ) 1
(4 ) l h
x x 
    
Together with (7c) and (7d), this first order condition yields: 
 
* *2 2 2
2 2 2
( )(4 ) (1 ) (1 )
2(2 ) (2 ) 2
l hc cc t     
       ,    (21a) 
 *f     .         (21b) 
The optimal level of investment is chosen such that outputs across qualities satisfy also: 
 
2
* * * *
2 2
(2 )( ) ( )
(4 )(1 )l h h l
x x c c 
    ,      (22) 
* * 2 *2 * 2 *2 *(1 ) (1 )l h l hx f x f         
* *( )h lc c

 .   (23) 
Given this information firm F’s quality choice is readily obtained. Repeating the steps of 
Section 4 expected profits of low-quality production can be obtained as:
 * * 2 *2 *1 1(1 )(1 ) (1 )l lK x f            
On the other hand, expected profits of high-quality production are: 
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 * * * 2 *2 *1 1( ) (1 )( ) (1 )(1 ) (1 )h h hc c c t K x f                    
Making use of (23), the difference in expected profits between high- and low-quality 
productions becomes: 
 * * * * *(1 )( )[(1 )( )] ( )l h h h lc c c t c c
  
             (24) 
Using (24) we can establish the following proposition: 
Proposition 5 (Investment & tainted food): The foreign firm will produce and export 
tainted food when it is optimal to invest resources in image building under the condition:  
 * * *(1 ) ( ) ( )(1 )( )h l hc c c c c t
  
       ,     (25) 
The incentives to produce low quality in (25) can be compared with those in (11). The 
former is satisfied when * *h lc c . The intuition is that high-quality production is out of reach 
for some firms in the foreign country, due to, say, too high compliance costs that must be 
incurred to meet the high sanitary standards imposed by the H government. Those firms then 
decide to skimp on quality and export tainted products. This is possible as long as local 
health authorities are only able to check a very small fraction of total shipments.  
Another implication of this scenario is the clear cut effect of the specific tariff t: 
* * * *( ) ( ) ( )(1 ) 0h l l h c
t t
                 (26) 
Unambiguously, an increase in t causes, ceteris paribus, a decrease (increase) in the 
incentives to produce high-quality goods (tainted products). As a result the shaded area of 
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Figure 3 that gives all parameter combinations that support free trade is enlarged and 
includes all feasible parameter combinations. We thus have: 
Proposition 6 (Investment & free trade): When the foreign firm invest resources to 
improve consumers’ perception of its product, free trade is the trading system that provides 
the highest incentives to foreign exporters to produce non-tainted high-quality goods.  
Again, this result runs counter to the popular claim by some government officials and 
consumer organizations that favor increased protectionism as a means to prevent tainted 
imports. Together with Proposition 3, it shows freer trade is necessary to induce high-quality 
non-tainted imports, when governments in practice cannot raise the rate of import inspection. 
Figure 3  Investment and Free Trade 
 
 Note: The shaded area gives all pairs *( , )hc c  such that free trade is optimal. 
7. Sabotage 
Foreign firm’s export success is very often subject to countermeasures by the 
domestic firm which does not want the market for its products to fade away. Possible 
reactions are sabotage activities by domestic competitors. The term ‘sabotage’ usually refers 
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to countermeasures in market contests that are almost unobservable and sometimes illegal. 
The idea that stems from Veblen (1923) in the context of business competition and market 
power has since been considered in several fields: for example, Baumol (1992) on innovation, 
Salop and Scheffman (1987) and Roy and Viaene (1998) on raising rivals’ cost, Lazear 
(1989) on contests within firms and Konrad (2000) on lobbying efforts for policy favors. 
Sabotage activities take at least two forms. One is damaging the rival’s image, and the other 
is increasing the rival’s costs. Since we have shown in the preceding section that the former 
is dominated by firm F’s image-building investments, we shall focus on the latter.13 
 Raising rival’s cost is effective for firm H, simply because some of the market 
equilibria of Table 1(b) might reverse in its favor. Denoting sabotage activities by s, marginal 
costs can be expressed as *( )ic s  with 
*( ) 0ic s s   . We obtain straightforwardly: 
Proposition 7 (Sabotage): Sabotage by the domestic firm aimed at raising the foreign firm’s 
marginal cost of production: (i) decreases the likelihood of tainting if the marginal cost of 
low quality is increased; (ii) causes tainting if the marginal cost of high quality is increased. 
Proof: Sabotage of low-quality production affects only one cell of Table 2(a): when the 
imported good is not checked, for which consumers have to gain experience. In this case only 
(12) is affected. With *( )lc s  increasing in s, sabotage reduces both 
*2
lx  and the right hand side 
of (12). The likelihood of tainting decreases which proves part (i). To prove part (ii) note that 
sabotage of high-quality production affects all market equilibria of Table 2(b). With 
sufficient sabotage activity, the limit pricing condition (4) reverses to: 
                                                 
13  Examples include business interruptions caused by strikes, punctured packaged products, sabotage in counterfeit 
hardware, sabotage of networks, etc. Bailed out American International Group advertises insurances that are designed to 
cover these specific risks (see the AIG Web site). 
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   * *max , ( ) ( )h h hp c c s t c s t        (4’) 
Foreign profits in Table 2(b) then become: 
   * *1( )
I
h K   ,  * *2 2( ) 0Ih h    
In turn, domestic profits take the following values: 
   * *1 2 2( ) ( ) 1 ( ( ) ) ( )
I I
h h h h hc s t c s t c                  (5’) 
Using (5’), the participation constraint of the domestic firm in sabotage activities is: 
   * *( ) 1 ( ( ) ) ( )h hc s t c s t c s               
Turning now to expected profits, while (9) remains unchanged, (10) becomes: 
* * 2 *2
1(1 )(1 )h hK x            (10’) 
The difference in expected discounted profits between low- and high-quality productions is 
obtained by taking the difference between (9) and (10’): 
* * 2 *2 *2
1 1(1 )(1 )( ) 0l h l hx x        , 
that is always positive. Thus tainting in this case is caused by sabotage of high-quality 
production by the domestic firm.  ■ 
This proposition has important implications. First note that sabotage of low-quality 
tainted imports affects profits in the first period when imports are not checked whereas 
sabotage of high quality affects multi-period profits under all inspection status. The dominant 
strategy of firm H is therefore to affect firm F‘s marginal cost of high quality. Firm F taking 
this into account will produce the low-quality variant, even worse, the incentives to produce 
tainted goods increase. This will allow the domestic firm to enjoy a monopoly position as 
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described in Table 1. Home consumers have the most to lose as a consequence, since 
sabotage increases both foreign tainting and the home firm’s market power.  
In addition, we can characterize the cost-minimizing level of sabotage activity. Let s  
denote the level of sabotage such that average costs are just equal across firms. Any sabotage 
activity slightly above s  allows the domestic firm to be more efficient. From the limit price 
condition (4) we have: * ( )h hp c c s t   . Solving for s  gives * 1( )hs c c t   with 0.s t    
Hence we straightforwardly obtain the following result: 
Proposition 8 (Sabotage & Free trade): Free trade increases the domestic firm’s cost to 
sabotage foreign production of high quality, which consequently lowers tainting.  
8. Welfare 
Whatever the choice of firm F, aggregate welfare of the home country is important. 
The H government can increase inspection   by spending more resources, and/or use tariffs 
to maximize welfare across firm F’s choices. However, the measurement of welfare is a 
complex issue with experience goods. The ex ante consumer surplus derived from 
consumption choices differs from unknown ex post consumer surplus because the latter 
includes the disutility generated by first-period consumption of eventually tainted goods. If 
consumption of tainted food leads to diseases or death, the disutility is so overwhelming that 
the aggregate welfare may become negative. On the other hand, more often less extreme 
situations exist. Defective products for example do not put public health in danger and their 
consumption is justified if prices are sufficiently low. Also the tariff has two opposing effects. 
It raises both the consumer price and the tariff revenue. Thus the source of gain for the H 
government resides in the optimal capture of the foreign exporter’s surplus. 
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Domestic welfare is defined as the arithmetic sum of consumer surplus ( iCS ), home 
firm’s profits ( i ) and tariff revenue ( iR ): i i i iW CS R   . Using consumers’ utility in (1) 
and (2), consumer surplus can be written as the net utility derived from consuming ix  and
*
ix : 
* * 2 *2 *(1 ) ( ) ( ) / 2i i i i i i i i iCS p x p x x x x x        ,    i = l,h   (27)     
Thus an increase in prices reduces the consumption of the numeraire good and utility. 
Table 6  Components of Domestic Welfare 
(a) Firm F Produces Low Quality 
Inspection 
probabilities 
Period 1  Period 2 
Inspection   2
1( ) (1 ) 8
I
lCS c   
2
1( ) (1 ) / 4
I
l c    
1( ) 0
I
lR   
2
2( ) (1 ) 8
I
lCS c 
2
2( ) (1 ) / 4
I
l c    
2( ) 0
I
lR   
No inspection 
(1 )  
* * 2 *2 *
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1(1 ) ( ) ( ) / 2l l l l l l l l lCS p x p x x x x x         
2 2
1 1(1 )l lx    
*
1 1l lR tx  
2
2 (1 ) 8lCS c   
2
2 (1 ) / 4l c    
2 0lR   
(b) Firm F Produces High Quality 
Inspection 
probabilities 
Period 1  Period 2 
Inspection   2
1( ) (1 ) 2
I
hCS c   
1( ) 0
I
h   
1( ) (1 )
I
lR t c   
2
2( ) (1 ) 2
I
hCS c 
2( ) 0
I
h   
2( ) (1 )
I
hR t c   
No 
inspection 
(1 )  
* * 2 *2 *
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1(1 ) ( ) ( ) / 2h h h h h h h h hCS p x p x x x x x         
2 2
1 1(1 )h hx    
*
1 1h hR tx  
2
2 (1 ) 2hCS c   
2 0h   
2 (1 )hR t c   
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Table 6 reproduces the components of welfare across periods and inspection status. 
The cells are obtained using preceding derivations, and we emphasize that the ex ante 
measure of consumer surplus is used. The expected utility under quality i is given by: 
1 2 1 2( ) ( ) (1 ) (1 )
I I
i i i i iW W W W           ,   i = l,h  
where   denotes the private discount factor common to all agents. Using Table 6 yields: 
 2 2 2 *1 1 13( )(1 ) / 8 (1 ) (1 )l l l lc CS x tx              ,      (28a)
 2 2 2 *1 1 1( ) (1 ) / 2 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )h h h hc t c CS x tx                    ,    (28b) 
which gives the expected present value of welfare difference between high- and low-quality: 
  
 
2
1 1
2 2 * *
1 1 1 1( ) (1 )(1 )
  ( )(1 ) (1 ) / 8
              ( ) ( )h l
h l
h l h lCS CS
c c t
x x t x x
   
  
     
     
      (29)  
The first term is positive, since the market for high-quality products is more competitive. The 
contribution of the second term is unknown under general conditions because the difference 
in consumer surpluses cannot be signed analytically.14 
Given this, we perform numerical simulations to give an interpretation to (29). Figure 4 
reproduces these in a three- dimensional graph combining t, c and *hc , based on a grid 
between 0 and 1 and parameter drawings are constrained by Assumption 1. The graph 
illustrates the difference in present-value welfare between high- and low-quality production, 
that is the threshold 0h l   . The area below or to the right of the plane is indicative of a 
welfare of low quality that exceeds that of high quality ((29) is negative); vice versa for the  
                                                 
14 When optimal, investments in image building connect ' s  across quality types. This eases the comparison of consumer 
surpluses, and thus the analytical difficulty disappears. 
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area to the left of the planes. An important conclusion to draw from Figure 4 is that the set of 
parameters under which low quality is preferred to high quality is not empty. A higher   
would increase ceteris paribus the area under this plane. Likewise the area under the plane 
(see (29)) becomes larger when   or   decreases. 
Figure 4  Ex ante Welfare and Low-Quality Products 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Assumed parameter values: *0.11;  1/(1.05);  0.5;  0lc      ; 0.7   
 
9. Concluding Remarks 
This paper considered international trade in tainted food and examined various 
designs of incentive schemes for exporting firms to produce non-tainted, high-quality 
products. The issue arises because many governments and consumer organizations relying on 
food imports have repeatedly put forward the view that the process of further globalization 
should be halted. Central to the issue, is the popular conjecture that the global food crisis 
calls for more restrictions on international trade in order to prevent imports of tainted food. 
However, a main result of this paper shows the opposite: for a large class of environments, 
free trade is the trading system that provides the highest incentives to foreign exporters to 
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produce non-tainted high-quality goods. This is reinforced when the foreign firm undertakes 
image building investments. Moreover, imposing a tariff may decrease the cost of sabotage 
activities by the domestic firm, further increasing the foreign firm’s incentives to produce 
low quality and raising the domestic firm’s market power. As a consequence, home 
consumers lose as they pay higher prices due to more market concentration. 
The setup of this paper could be extended in a number of ways. For example, so far 
we have assumed that a low-quality good is not imported once inspected by authorities. It is 
possible to allow imports of such goods as long as they are not poisonous. The model 
becomes then a model with two different types of qualities (but no tainting). The assumption 
of certification could also be relaxed. With certification, there is no reason for consumers to 
discount imports. Authorities certify that foreign goods are of the same grade as home goods. 
This was the scenario envisaged in Table 1(b). However, an inefficient firm H has incentives 
to lobby the government against the act of certification simply because in its absence, 
consumers keep on discounting foreign goods and product differentiation is maintained. Most 
qualitative results of the paper are not altered in this new setting. In addition, many industrial 
countries rely on imports for most of their food products.15 Hence, relying on a single home 
producer as indicated in Table 1 might not be feasible once tainted food is uncovered (by 
inspection or by experience), simply because the home monopolist does not produce enough 
in calorie terms. Finding a substitute for firm F is possible if the model considers more 
foreign firms. This would not change results as long as Assumption 1 is maintained, i.e., as 
long as the firm with the lowest marginal cost is an exporting firm. Bertrand competition then 
                                                 
15 For example, Japan’s food self-sufficiency rate stood at 39 percent in 2006, the lowest level in industrialized countries. 
Rice, eggs and a few other types of food are the only food items the country currently produces sufficiently to meet domestic 
demand (The Daily Yomiuri, November 4, 2008). 
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yields market equilibria that are similar to those described in the paper. Though domestic 
welfare will differ, incentives to the foreign firm are not altered, and most propositions still 
remain robust. Further, the H-government could impose tariffs on first-period imports only, 
and let imports come in free in the second period. This then rewards high quality exports in 
the second period and home welfare might be improved. The same logic applies to 
incorporating multi-periods in the model. As the time horizon rises, the incentives to produce 
higher quality increase. Finally, instead of the experience-good approach, an alternative is to 
assume one period only and allow the foreign firm to produce mixed qualities, in which case 
multiple equilibria can arise and policy recommendations will become complicated. 
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